[Col.Hornet]

Some cool footage I found. I'm really curious of that system which allows the crew to control the vehicles remotely.

Demonstration of T-14

And Koalitsya SPG

[Mika]

Some cool footage I found. I'm really curious of that system which allows the crew to control the vehicles remotely.

I'm sort of hoping it would!

Take a look on the history with respect to that!

There's actually a popular take of that history around here, about playing greatest hits for the mines to make them blow up...

EDIT: Link added

[Dragon]

I don't think Russians are going to fall for that one again. The amount of EW gear on that thing is quite impressive, TBH. I want this tank in ArmAIII.

That said, the greatest strength of the design is somewhat easy to overlook among all this showmanship: the common chassis. For this reason alone, I can confidently say this system is superior to anything NATO has. It's been said that NATO tanks win battles, while Russian ones win campaigns. Armata is an extension of this philosophy. Logistical advantage of that system is going to be absolutely staggering. With common manufacturing equipment, common replacement parts and presumably a degree of common training, the real strength of Armata is in logistics.

That, and it makes ArmAIII modders' job much easier, with the ability to reuse the models between vehicles without being accused of lazyness. I say, Russians did a great job with the Armata.

[Mika]

Of course not, I'm not expecting that. Just saying all new stuff also opens up possibilities for interesting new games.

Remember how it went with the Soviet T-34 - a lot of what is being said about the Armata sounds a lot of what people were saying about T-34. Except, it turned out that T-34 was not that great after all, being almost a campaign ending disaster on the Easter Front leading with a lot of Russians defending it by "We didn't need to design it environmentally resistant or durable, it progresses 200 km and is likely destroyed anyways!" Yeah, right!

By the way, the same thing applies to Russian MiGs and Su-whatevers, starting from mechanics drinking the avionics coolant fluid .

Remember: Russia is Russia.

EDIT: Actually, thinking about it, I don't think the common chassis will be that great. For me it sounds that it would make APCs too big and heavy - there's a reason why other armies have made the APC different from a tank, and I think a lot of that has to do with weight, mobility and size. Finnish APC Nasu houses like 15 people in a very small target, and to provide excellent mobility in the forest, it principally isn't armored. And the strangest thing? I'm OK with that, having spent something like 12 months with those things - that speed in the woods, though. The wheeled APC Pasi was a bit different case in Southern Finland, we actually crashed with that one as the driver slipped of from an icy road to woods around 60 km/h. Probably the one and only time I'm laughing when being in a vehicle that is colliding with trees...

[Col.Hornet]

Not to mention that Armata platform-based vehicles would suffer terrible difficulties with punching through all these Finnish wetlands and tough terrain. I would be much more worried if they attacked us. We have a lot of flat and dry space, perfect for MBT combat. I hope that we will receive highest class anti-tank ammo and complex modernization for our Leopard 2's (both A4 and A5 variants).

Other interesting thing is how many of these things can Russians introduce to service per year. Crappy economic situation is likely to cool down their ambitions but as we know from history... Russians are capable of prioritizing tanks over food for their own if they need.

[Dragon]

Finland is a crappy place for tank combat anyway. Any tank would have trouble with terrain like that, Armata or not. I suppose they could try fitting the turret (it's modular as well) on a snowmobile chassis if they wanted to invade Finland, as that's about the only vehicle which is good in there.

As for the T-34, well, it was designed in a completely different situation. It was a tank designed in wartime, during shortage on good materials and using a particularly finicky suspension based on a rejected (guess why) American design. Not to mention it still won them the war thanks to sheer numbers it was produced it. All in all, T-34 wasn't all that bad of a tank, from a strategic standpoint. Tankers would disagree (when the commissar was out of earshot, of course ), but nobody asked them anyway.

EDIT: Actually, thinking about it, I don't think the common chassis will be that great. For me it sounds that it would make APCs too big and heavy - there's a reason why other armies have made the APC different from a tank, and I think a lot of that has to do with weight, mobility and size. Finnish APC Nasu houses like 15 people in a very small target, and to provide excellent mobility in the forest, it principally isn't armored. And the strangest thing? I'm OK with that, having spent something like 12 months with those things - that speed in the woods, though. The wheeled APC Pasi was a bit different case in Southern Finland, we actually crashed with that one as the driver slipped of from an icy road to woods around 60 km/h. Probably the one and only time I'm laughing when being in a vehicle that is colliding with trees...

The T-15 isn't an APC, though. It's an IFV. The APC you're talking about is a wheeled platform, it has more in common with Bumerang APC than with T-15. The Armata system shares the IFV turret with Bumerang, but the common chassis is for IFVs, SPGs and tanks, which are heavy by definition. Of course, the T-15 IFV is going to be one of the heaviest ones around, but on the other hand, it will be capable of keeping up with tanks and fighting alongside them if needed. It's not even a new idea, the Israeli Namer IFV is a similar concept based on Merkava, though with much weaker armament.

[SpardaSon21]

The T-34 also very nearly lost the USSR the war due to how easy it was for a T-34 to become inoperable due to mechanical failure or being destroyed in combat.
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the-t-34-in-wwii-the-legend-vs-the-performance/

Given the T-14 breaking down on a freaking parade route, I'm doubtful its actual combat performance will be much better.

[Dragon]

It wasn't actually a breakdown, the T-14 video explained how this happened. The Armata driver's station is very different from the old Russian tanks (just check the video, it looks nothing like any tank I've seen) and they were given one month for adapting. Sure, they're playing that off as a demonstration how easy it is to adopt to Armata, but my guess is that it wasn't always quite enough. The driver applied the brakes by mistake when trying to steer the tank back into the lane, then got confused and didn't know what to do. The same tank later drove off under its own power, so I don't think that explanation is propaganda. There was nothing wrong with the tank (and the driver is probably stuck driving garbage trucks now. Though he should be glad he didn't do that in Stalin's time, or he'd have bigger problems... ).

Yeah, T-34 was easy to knock out. The key here, I think, was that they made them faster than the Germans could destroy them. The same place mentions just that, the Soviets had about twice the AFVs on their front as the Germans. That was the greatest strength of the design. Sure, it was definitely too easy to take out, even given its numbers, but Soviets were always firm believers in quantity over quality, not only on the battlefield. I don't think that at that time, they could have built a better tank with comparable speed. It was definitely easier to get the workers to work faster than work better (communist Poland had the same problem. There was a saying "whether you're standing or laying down, two thousand is what you get"). About the one thing they could have certainly done better was the suspension, and I believe one of the later versions of T-34 got that reworked.

[NGTM-1R]

The T-34 also very nearly lost the USSR the war due to how easy it was for a T-34 to become inoperable due to mechanical failure or being destroyed in combat.
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the-t-34-in-wwii-the-legend-vs-the-performance/

Given the T-14 breaking down on a freaking parade route, I'm doubtful its actual combat performance will be much better.

Oh hey Wehraboo site. Break out the wehrabingo cards and go through that, I'll wait.

The T-34's breakdown rate was actually perfect for the way the Russians used it, so this argument is on extremely shakey ground on several points. (They make a claim at one point that it didn't render existing German tanks obsolete by default; they never back this claim up, because there is no sane way to do so.) The T-34 was a mass-production expendable vehicle for the Soviet style of operational rather than tactical warfare. Its operating time before overhaul or breakdown was carefully calculated to just exceed its mean time to being knocked out in combat operations. At that point the crew would be transferred to another vehicle while their original one is either dead or in overhaul, exactly as intended. It in no way "almost cost the Russians the war" (the arguments made to this effect are ones that have little to do with the tank and everything to do with the poor state of Soviet logistics and leadership during the 1941-1942 period) and in fact its dependable breakdown characteristics was a key part of their success by making logistics simple.

In fact, it wasn't until Chechenaya and Gulf One that the Russian idea of the ideal vehicle changed significantly from the one represented by the T-34's mean-time-to-knocked-out/mean-time-to-breakdown being roughly the same; they designed their whole army that way. (A Soviet armored or motor-rifle division, for example, was provided with 72 hours of organic supplies for ammunition, food, and fuel; this is the amount of time it was judged that the unit would remain combat-effective. After that it would be replaced in the line and withdrawn for reorganization.) The extended operations of Chechenaya on one hand and demonstration that highly survivable vehicles could defeat many less-survivable ones during Gulf One changed the Russians' minds, and resulted in T-90 and T-14.

Then again, T-90s have fought in the Ukraine and for all their supposed improvement, the results have been embarrassing.

[Col.Hornet]

...

Then again, T-90s have fought in the Ukraine and for all their supposed improvement, the results have been embarrassing.

Don't forget about Syria. Syrian Arab Army received some of these tanks recently. As I've read they are doing pretty well there. Certainly better then T-72's that's sure.

http://www.almasdarnews.com/article/russian-t-90-tanks-make-the-difference-in-southern-aleppo-as-the-syrian-army-surround-khan-touman/

Active protection systems will save a lot of tankers lives as terrorists use many ATGM launchers (US provided TOWs and Russian made Konkurs from Saudi stockpiles)

[NGTM-1R]

Don't forget about Syria. Syrian Arab Army received some of these tanks recently. As I've read they are doing pretty well there. Certainly better then T-72's that's sure.

Hmm. Ironically, in Ukraine, they've largely lost to Ukrainian T-64 variants. There US Army has put out a series of reports on the tank fighting in Ukraine that make for interesting reading. The most effective killer of tanks there has been other tanks with KE penetrators. (Though apparently Russian Kontakt-5 ERA is not handling tandem-charge Western missiles as well as the Ukrainian "Knife" ERA copes with Russian tandem-charge missiles. Oops.) The widespread use of ERA/cage/slat armor means most vehicles survive a Konkurs or RPG hit, and as long as they don't stand still for very long they're usually safe from anything but another tank.

[Dragon]

Even though it was built after Chechen war, T-90 was still not really made for tank-to-tank combat. Again, Russian tanks are meant to win campaigns, not tank battles. In the latter regard, T-90 inferior to Western tanks. It was designed with attacking supply lines and generally fighting inferior enemies, while being mobile enough to evade superior Western tanks. For instance, it's almost 20T lighter than the Abrams and much smaller as well. Vulnerability to anti-tank KE penetrators is to be expected.

In both of the conflicts quoted, the above is shown perfectly. T-90 lost against Ukrainian tanks, but in Syria, when used in conditions it was designed for, it excelled. Soviet doctrine always placed major emphasis on campaign-level planning, sometimes even eschewing tactical-level superiority. Soviets designed their weapons (not only tanks, but also planes and other vehicles) to work as a part of a larger system. In contrast, NATO hardware is generally made to excel at 1-on-1 duels and maximize individual performance.

While the Russian approach may sound more effective in a regular war, this does mean that they are much more vulnerable to blunders on operational level. Also, it's inferior in situations where there are no supply lines to cut, or in small-scale guerrilla conflicts where the "campaign level planning" doesn't amount to much. As it happens, most of today's conflicts are like this. Time will tell if Armata addresses problems that the earlier designs had in those areas.

[Col.Hornet]

As I hoped... it's happening

http://bumar.gliwice.pl/pierwsze-leopardy-juz-u-nas/

Polish Leo 2's modernization process has already begun. First stage will be a domestic maintenance, then we shall add some additional armor  for the A4's, new optics and fire control systems to make the tanks being capable of using newest types of ammunition. Modernization will be performed by Polish defense industry in cooperation with German Rheinmetall Defense.


It would be great to removed the old, used cannons and install the new ones but I'm not sure if this will happen anytime soon.

[Mika]

The T-34 was a mass-production expendable vehicle for the Soviet style of operational rather than tactical warfare. Its operating time before overhaul or breakdown was carefully calculated to just exceed its mean time to being knocked out in combat operations. At that point the crew would be transferred to another vehicle while their original one is either dead or in overhaul, exactly as intended. It in no way "almost cost the Russians the war" (the arguments made to this effect are ones that have little to do with the tank and everything to do with the poor state of Soviet logistics and leadership during the 1941-1942 period) and in fact its dependable breakdown characteristics was a key part of their success by making logistics simple.

I know this is usually given as an explanation. However, it doesn't make sense to me. If the tank breaks down regularly at certain interval, then you must make sure you'll have good transportation capabilities. This wasn't the case for USSR on the Eastern Front (or anywhere in USSR to be frank, and actually, it still is not), and the dysfunctional T-34s were very close to cost the USSR the war as the planned replacements could not arrive fast enough on the front lines. And then the replacements broke on the front line without contributing to the push forward. It seems to me that the T-34 held some kind of tactical advantage over its temporary rivals, but almost caused a strategical disaster.

In a way, USSR strategy was like Zapp Brannigan's: give opposition enough targets so that they run out of bullets. The much more logical reason for the tank breaking down is actually poor material quality, poor production standards and uncaring assembly and production personnel - I do not believe the tank was designed to break that way, but instead the strategy had to be modified (and rewritten) to take this into account. The similar stuff applies to Russian airframe engines, the usual reason for shorter MTBFs is given with that the Russian engines are designed to run hotter, produce more thrust and thus break faster. The actual reason for that is lacking material technology to produce equivalent thrust on lower temperatures. Which becomes evident when considering the unit operation costs - it's kind of funny that the Soviets were touting MiG-29 to be cheap, when the actual real life cost was IIRC the highest when Finnish Air Force was selecting its fighters.

What it comes to quantity over quality, it's something the Russians do not learn. They have been given numerous lessons of that - mentally it's just much easier to go to war with a bigger bunch of dudes regardless the quality of said dudes. Perhaps T-14 is a step from that, but at least the Karelian brigades have selected the modernized T-80 over Armata. I don't know the reason for that and can only speculate.

Sorry about mistaking IFV to APC, don't know what I was thinking. What I meant to say is that if based on the Armata chassis, the resulting IFV will likely be too heavy and large for a typical operational theatre, limiting its usage. It may not be possible to air lift it, for example. Note the NATO experiences in Afghanistan mirror this in a way that the requirements of the next IFVs seem to aim for better mobility at the cost of armor. And that Bumerang. I can almost hear Russians saying the design is their own work and they didn't copy it from anyone, honest! Then again, imitation is the best form of flattery.

Congratulations on Poland upgrading the tanks. Consider also the asymmetrical responses to the Russian tanks, sometimes it's not about direct engagement, and more about outsmarting and outpositioning the opponent. And preferably shooting the opponent when they cannot even respond.

EDIT: What it comes to USSR strategy of cutting supply lines, that was not the case here. Instead, they preferred the breakthrough attack formation which ironically left their supply lines open for counter attacks.

[Scotty]

The T-34 was a mass-production expendable vehicle for the Soviet style of operational rather than tactical warfare. Its operating time before overhaul or breakdown was carefully calculated to just exceed its mean time to being knocked out in combat operations. At that point the crew would be transferred to another vehicle while their original one is either dead or in overhaul, exactly as intended. It in no way "almost cost the Russians the war" (the arguments made to this effect are ones that have little to do with the tank and everything to do with the poor state of Soviet logistics and leadership during the 1941-1942 period) and in fact its dependable breakdown characteristics was a key part of their success by making logistics simple.

I know this is usually given as an explanation. However, it doesn't make sense to me. If the tank breaks down regularly at certain interval, then you must make sure you'll have good transportation capabilities. This wasn't the case for USSR on the Eastern Front (or anywhere in USSR to be frank, and actually, it still is not), and the dysfunctional T-34s were very close to cost the USSR the war as the planned replacements could not arrive fast enough on the front lines. And then the replacements broke on the front line without contributing to the push forward. It seems to me that the T-34 held some kind of tactical advantage over its temporary rivals, but almost caused a strategical disaster.

In a way, USSR strategy was like Zapp Brannigan's: give opposition enough targets so that they run out of bullets. The much more logical reason for the tank breaking down is actually poor material quality, poor production standards and uncaring assembly and production personnel - I do not believe the tank was designed to break that way, but instead the strategy had to be modified (and rewritten) to take this into account. The similar stuff applies to Russian airframe engines, the usual reason for shorter MTBFs is given with that the Russian engines are designed to run hotter, produce more thrust and thus break faster. The actual reason for that is lacking material technology to produce equivalent thrust on lower temperatures. Which becomes evident when considering the unit operation costs - it's kind of funny that the Soviets were touting MiG-29 to be cheap, when the actual real life cost was IIRC the highest when Finnish Air Force was selecting its fighters.

I hate to say it so bluntly, but you are flat out wrong.  Your "much more logical reason" is factually incorrect.  Russian tanks in mid World War 2 were deliberately built such that the average time it took one to break down was also the average time it took one to be knocked out by enemy fire.  This allowed factories to save time, money, and materials by machining their tools to looser tolerances, and increased the output of Russian factories significantly.  By late World War 2 they controlled sufficient rail infrastructure that getting tanks to the front was a transportation issue that Russia was eminently capable of tackling.  The USSR actually had significant advantages in tank construction that German simply did not (or could not) replicate.  German tanks (in particular the Tiger and its derivatives) had significant mechanical issues that were caused by literally the opposite of all the things you just listed.

[Mika]

I hate to say it so bluntly, but you are flat out wrong.  Your "much more logical reason" is factually incorrect.  Russian tanks in mid World War 2 were deliberately built such that the average time it took one to break down was also the average time it took one to be knocked out by enemy fire.

I reserve the right for the possibility that I may be wrong. However, my first question when these statements are abound is to ask "factually incorrect according to whom?". Western sources that rely on Russian sources? To prove that this was the case they would need to have gone to the Soviet factories and check whether their equipment would have allowed better accuracies at that time. Unfortunately, much of those factories were inaccessible to Western people, and many of them do not exist anymore!

Then consider that the Soviets lie and how systematic that is. It should be common knowledge at that point that the Soviet Union revised their history several times. They revised several other things as well, also why the Second World War was such a big blow for USSR. Here in Finland I actually was taught that the German operation Barbarossa was a proactive move and a mistake since the outcome would be evident to anybody (the Finnish history teaching had to kiss Soviet ass at the time). This is bull**** at least on the first part. Barbarossa was a reactive thing, and definitely not a mistake - one of the few right decisions by Germany at the time. This is because Soviet Union was planning an attack to Central Europe and was amassing troops to the border - Germans caught them pants down and destroyed a large portion of the equipment, hence my comment T-34 could not arrive fast enough to replace the destroyed ones. That's the strategical catastrophe I was talking about. It's also not T-34 that stopped Tigers. It was the Allied air campaign that destroyed the factories.

If you have also some engineering background, you'll also know that you'll design according to the tolerances that the factory can make - anything better will not happen anyways. However, you don't also want to over-specify those parts where the tolerances are not needed, but not to under-specify the parts where the tolerances are needed. During the time I've walked on this Earth, I have never seen a comparable product coming from Soviet Union that would convince me they could have done better tolerance-wise. Thus I see it possible that the T-34 being what it is is actually the result of USSR production capabilities, and not by the original design. I also see it possible that the T-34 is described in the way it is described in the books because the performance had to be justified somehow to the politbyro while not making the production facilities look bad.

[Dragon]

Whatever was the underlying reason, one fact remains: T-34 was an expandable vehicle. Whether by necessity or by design, the USSR strategic doctrine was built around this. And it worked.

Also, nobody claims T-34s were any good against Tigers, though they definitely weren't completely helpless against them, either. The IS-2 tanks were the Soviet "Tiger killers". And that's even without mentioning the Tiger's own problems.

[NGTM-1R]

I know this is usually given as an explanation. However, it doesn't make sense to me.

This is because you're not sufficiently educated to be discussing this issue.

If the tank breaks down regularly at certain interval, then you must make sure you'll have good transportation capabilities.

Why? This is certainly not how the Germans handled the fact the Panther couldn't handle a 100km drive without its final drives spontaneously combusting. (Their solution was usually to grin and bear it, and when that failed, destroy the vehicle in place.) It's in no way matched to American experience on the matter, which was based around battalion-level refits for knocked-out tanks that saw most of them back in action in less then a week.

What are you arguing for here? Full factory refit? That's crazy talk. There are levels of maintenance you perform on a tank, of course. Field maintenance is easier than depot is easier than factory, but the fact that the Soviets designed the T-34 to require depot-level maintenance around the point it would normally be knocked out is hardly going to require "good transportation capabilities"; you simply drag it to the battalion or regimental maintenance group with another tank. There is actually very little you can do to a WW2-era tank, even in terms of combat damage, that demands a factory-level refit.

This wasn't the case for USSR on the Eastern Front (or anywhere in USSR to be frank, and actually, it still is not), and the dysfunctional T-34s were very close to cost the USSR the war as the planned replacements could not arrive fast enough on the front lines.

Even in the most fever-dream sources from the German side, this would be regarded as base insanity and I cannot fathom how or why you would arrive at this novel...theory. The T-34's planned replacement T-43 was not only ready to go in late 1942, it was deliberately rejected in favor of the more limited T-34/85 upgrade to keep production numbers up. Base T-34/76 was superior in every meaningful combat sense to existent German tank designs until Tiger, and Tiger was never numerous enough to be a useful weapon. Even when deliberately massed during engagements like Kursk, the Russians more or less wrote the book on how to deal with Tigers via defense in depth and interlocking fields of fire with AT guns. In Russia, the newspaper reporting the blunting of the German offensive with the headline "The Tigers Are Burning!" is famous.

If you're arguing in a more tactical scope, then there's nothing to support you at all and this argument becomes even more incomprehensible.

And then the replacements broke on the front line without contributing to the push forward. It seems to me that the T-34 held some kind of tactical advantage over its temporary rivals, but almost caused a strategical disaster.

Again, crazy talk. There's nothing like this in any existent source of the period, even the breathlessly pro-German ones. I just pointed that out with the Operation Barbarossa site, that it made claims, and did not back them.

The much more logical reason for the tank breaking down is actually poor material quality, poor production standards and uncaring assembly and production personnel - I do not believe the tank was designed to break that way, but instead the strategy had to be modified (and rewritten) to take this into account.

Unfortunately, design documentation is available and disagrees with this. Besides, if you honestly believe that any of this is necessarily an impediment to a long-lasting machine, the T-55 was notorious for dumping nearly a kilogram of metal shavings into its oil sump as the engine knocked off the unfinished bits during the first hundred hours of operation. You just filter them out and keep going, no biggie.

Realistically, the T-34 isn't even breaking down in a meaningful way in this discussion. Every 90 hours of operational life, it requires depot-level preventive maintenance to adjust the transmission. That's what's happening here. The only reason this is true is due to the awkward positioning of the transmission. It was entirely possible to have moved the transmission if it was necessary. It was not.

I reserve the right for the possibility that I may be wrong. However, my first question when these statements are abound is to ask "factually incorrect according to whom?". Western sources that rely on Russian sources?

So you're going to literally make **** up instead? Rely on the Germans sources, which were pretty much obvious feel-good nonsense when compared to their combat reports?

I mean, there were things wrong with the T-34 design. It was ergonomically one of the worse tanks of the war. The original two-man turret crew was not good, compounded by front-opening hatches that blocked the view forward. Some units literally issued the driver a sledgehammer because that was the force it took to change the gears. They were not originally equipped with radios enough (though when it became obvious that a radio for every vehicle was a necessity, the Soviets spared no expense to make it happen). Their tactical application was frequently lacking. But the problems you're arguing for are simply ridiculous, born of ignorance about the platform, about what is actually being discussed when we talk about mean-time-to-failure here.

[Mika]

This is because you're not sufficiently educated to be discussing this issue.

This comment I find particularly hilarious, since I apparently don't have what it takes to discuss this, what are your credentials then?

Why? This is certainly not how the Germans handled the fact the Panther couldn't handle a 100km drive without its final drives spontaneously combusting. (Their solution was usually to grin and bear it, and when that failed, destroy the vehicle in place.) It's in no way matched to American experience on the matter, which was based around battalion-level refits for knocked-out tanks that saw most of them back in action in less then a week.

What are you arguing for here? Full factory refit? That's crazy talk. There are levels of maintenance you perform on a tank, of course. Field maintenance is easier than depot is easier than factory, but the fact that the Soviets designed the T-34 to require depot-level maintenance around the point it would normally be knocked out is hardly going to require "good transportation capabilities"; you simply drag it to the battalion or regimental maintenance group with another tank. There is actually very little you can do to a WW2-era tank, even in terms of combat damage, that demands a factory-level refit.

I think you are ignoring one thing: Germans got quite far in the Russian territory despite their "tanks combusting after 100 kms", yet it took Soviets a couple of years and a winter to turn the tide. Now why would that be? The answer lies in the fact that a major production facility of T-34s in Ukraine were overrun and the next facility was quite far from the front lines. Now the Soviets faced the problem of dismal the transport capability from inner Russia to the front lines, leading to T-34s breaking down before they could arrive where they were needed. This is a problem that the Germans did not have in the initial phase of Barbarossa. The sides actually reversed as Germans were hit by the poor transport capabilities in Russian territory while the front line came closer to the production facilities. Incidentally, this is part of the coincidences why Finland was never occupied in WWII as Soviets had to direct a lot of Red Army to southern front.

And I don't think I have contested that the T-34 was not designed to be field repairable. What I said is that the thing breaking down is NOT by design, but a byproduct of poor assembly and production capability even for its time. Designing things to be repairable and designing things to break mean entirely different things in the engineering world. Designing things to break down reliably is typically more difficult than doing that by accident or as a byproduct of some other things, but you should already know this right?

Even when deliberately massed during engagements like Kursk, the Russians more or less wrote the book on how to deal with Tigers via defense in depth and interlocking fields of fire with AT guns. In Russia, the newspaper reporting the blunting of the German offensive with the headline "The Tigers Are Burning!" is famous.

Yeah, I recall lots of Soviet headlines from 1980s, and some of them were even true! The point was, if the nation is so deep in the history revision as Soviet Union was, no document can be held authentic. I can't stress this enough. Instead, you'll have to accept a type of quantum mechanical wavefront probability analogue for History: there is a probability that the claimed thing did not happen as reported, or what happened was entirely different. Which is why I said that in order to demonstrate that the breaking down of T-34 was actually by design you'd need to know the machine tooling accuracies in Soviet factories. But unfortunately, I don't think you can, and neither can the Western historians. Thus you'll have to assign a certain probability that what I say can be the true.

Case in point, the design documentation of T-34 can be written before or after the trials and revised several times by undisclosed parties. It is also possible that the requirement specification of Red Army has been influenced by their earlier accounts of T-27s breaking down, and they required the field repair capability be added (which is reasonable). The reason field repair capability was required is likely substandard performance of the T-27s, which is related to the manufacturing tolerances. Got it?

the T-55 was notorious for dumping nearly a kilogram of metal shavings into its oil sump as the engine knocked off the unfinished bits

Yeah, I got to look at the bottom plates of it from the ants perspective when it was moving. For your information, almost all Russian equipment used by Finnish Defence Forces have actually been modified by some degree for the above mentioned reasons. Vehicles have been specifically abhorrent, KraZ and UAZ included. There's no difference to this in the civil vehicles coming from the Soviet Union era. Skoda presentatives in Mlada Boleslav actually expressed that they were sorry of having to produce substandard vehicles in the last Soviet years when the quality difference had become obvious for everybody.

Their tactical application was frequently lacking. But the problems you're arguing for are simply ridiculous, born of ignorance about the platform, about what is actually being discussed when we talk about mean-time-to-failure here.

The correct English term is Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF).