[GhylTarvoke]

The demon's existence is not falsifiable. Science says nothing about its existence, so Occam's Razor advises me to favor a model without the demon.

The problem is that Consciousness_Bob holds exactly the same status as the demon! Science says nothing about its existence, so Occam's Razor advises me to favor a model in which I am the only locus of experience.

[Scotty]

Assuming that consciousness exists allows us to form predictive models of behavior and experience.  Occam's Razor is not a proof; invoking it and ignoring that the assumption grants us the ability to use (falsifiable) predictive models is fallacious.

[GhylTarvoke]

If by "consciousness", you mean Consciousness_Me, then it exists by definition. If you mean Consciousness_Bob, then how does it help me form predictive models? Positing the existence of multiple loci is completely unnecessary, and doesn't help explain anything. Like everything else, Bob's behavior can be explained purely by reductive arguments.

[NGTM-1R]

Why are you ultimately different from Bob?

[GhylTarvoke]

Maybe I am, or maybe I'm not. The "difference" under consideration is irrelevant when it comes to forming predictive models.

Thus, Consciousness_Bob (unlike virtually everything else, including Pluto) is logically independent of science, in the sense that science says nothing about its existence. Even if I assume the inviolate truth of science, I can't conclude anything about the existence of Consciousness_Bob.

[watsisname]

The demon's existence is not falsifiable. Science says nothing about its existence, so Occam's Razor advises me to favor a model without the demon.

The problem is that Consciousness_Bob holds exactly the same status as the demon! Science says nothing about its existence, so Occam's Razor advises me to favor a model in which I am the only locus of experience.

Man, you were so close to getting it that I could almost taste it.

This model of Consciousness_Bob holds exactly the same status as the demon model.  This is exactly why you should not subscribe to it!

You have another model, where Consciousness_Bob is an emergent property of the system Bob, in very much the same way that Consciousness_Me is an emergent property of the system Me.  Like the astrophysical models of stellar structure, it has excellent explanatory power.  It fits in the context of prior understanding of the universe (it's all just physics!), and it acts as a pathway to further understanding.

Dualism as a model of mind is the very antithesis of how we approach modelling in a scientific perspective.  Like supposing that the celestial light is just a trick by clever tarp demons, or that dinosaur bones were put in the ground by Satan to fool us, or that all of reality exists only in Newt Gingrich's lifetime... it's kind of dumb.

[GhylTarvoke]

You have another model, where Consciousness_Bob is an emergent property of the system Bob, in very much the same way that Consciousness_Me is an emergent property of the system Me.

This model still assumes the existence of Consciousness_Bob - an unnecessary assumption for which I have no evidence. Despite my intuition, the very notion of Consciousness_Bob may be incoherent.

Like the astrophysical models of stellar structure, it has excellent explanatory power.

What additional explanatory power does it offer? Why must Consciousness_Bob exist at all, if I can explain Bob's behavior using purely reductive arguments?

It fits in the context of prior understanding of the universe (it's all just physics!), and it acts as a pathway to further understanding.

"It's all just physics" is a metaphysical claim about the nature of reality. Regardless, the model in which Bob is not conscious also satisfies the claim.

If you're asking me to take the existence of Consciousness_Bob on faith, your argument sounds very similar to dualism.

[The E]

If your consciousness is an emergent property of your construction, then it follows that objects of similar construction will have similar emergent properties.


I mean, I am not really following these arguments of yours; it all reads so very solipsistic. Your claim that you can explain another's behaviour through purely reductive reasoning is already a sign of you massively overstepping the bounds of your confidence. Furthermore, if you posit that a being that is in all important aspects completely identical to you and that acts as if conscious actually isn't, then what evidence do you have that you are conscious? Yes, you claim it to be self-evident, but is it really?

[NGTM-1R]

What additional explanatory power does it offer? Why must Consciousness_Bob exist at all, if I can explain Bob's behavior using purely reductive arguments?

Why must you exist at all, in this paradigm? The moment you reduce all others' consciousness to reductive argument, so yours must be as well; unless you are capable of laying out a coherent argument for why you are a special case.

You are using a very simplistic argument-by-definition, one which holds that your viewpoint is unique. Bob can make the exact same argument as you are for his viewpoint being the unique one and his argument will be just as valid as yours is, unless you can establish some qualitative difference between you and Bob.

You have not done this. Your argument offers nothing over Bob's argument; both cannot be true at the same time but are otherwise in all respects identical; both are therefore likely false.

[GhylTarvoke]

If your consciousness is an emergent property of your construction, then it follows that objects of similar construction will have similar emergent properties.

"My consciousness is an emergent property of my construction" is an unnecessary assumption that offers no additional explanatory power.

The problem becomes even thornier when I try to define "similar". Okay, let's say Bob is conscious, since he and I are both human (whatever that means). Is a dog conscious? What about a plant? I face exactly the same difficulty that I faced with Bob, and only faith lets me draw a line.

I mean, I am not really following these arguments of yours; it all reads so very solipsistic. Your claim that you can explain another's behaviour through purely reductive reasoning is already a sign of you massively overstepping the bounds of your confidence.

The "Bob is not conscious" model is not solipsism. Science still applies, and everything still exists - except for Consciousness_Bob. If the model contains no contradictions, then studying consciousness in a scientific way becomes extremely difficult. In particular, I have no way of testing whether something is conscious.

Science may not currently explain Bob's behavior, but it can in theory. If you disagree, you seem to believe that there's something acausal about free will.

Furthermore, if you posit that a being that is in all important aspects completely identical to you and that acts as if conscious actually isn't, then what evidence do you have that you are conscious? Yes, you claim it to be self-evident, but is it really?

Why must you exist at all, in this paradigm?

See my definition of Consciousness_Me. Bob and I both exist.

The moment you reduce all others' consciousness to reductive argument, so yours must be as well; unless you are capable of laying out a coherent argument for why you are a special case.

You are using a very simplistic argument-by-definition, one which holds that your viewpoint is unique. Bob can make the exact same argument as you are for his viewpoint being the unique one and his argument will be just as valid as yours is, unless you can establish some qualitative difference between you and Bob.

You have not done this. Your argument offers nothing over Bob's argument; both cannot be true at the same time but are otherwise in all respects identical; both are therefore likely false.

"Reducing others' consciousness" presupposes that the notion of others' consciousness is coherent. Bob may make the same statements I make, but his statements may not even make sense. Furthermore (unless free will is acausal), I can theoretically use reductive arguments to explain why he makes those statements.

The only justification you've offered for positing others' consciousness is a massive extrapolation: based on a sample size of one (myself), I draw conclusions about a population of seven billion, and that's when I only consider human beings. Against Occam's Razor, this reasoning seems flimsy.

[The E]

[quote author=GhylTarvoke link=topic=90258.msg1814007#msg1814007 date=1455494785
"My consciousness is an emergent property of my construction" is an unnecessary assumption that offers no additional explanatory power.[/quote]

Then explain why people under the influence of drugs behave differently compared to when they are sober.

The problem becomes even thornier when I try to define "similar". Okay, let's say Bob is conscious, since he and I are both human (whatever that means). Is a dog conscious? What about a plant? I face exactly the same difficulty that I faced with Bob, and only faith lets me draw a line.

There is plenty of medical research, and quite a few successful product lines, based around the idea that human brains are similar enough that drugs will produce reproducable effects. Therefore, we have to assume that human brains share properties, and that if something is true for one brain, it will be true for any number of other brains as well.

Following from that, since we know that brains and consciousness are intimately connected, we have to assume that if one brain is conscious, others have to be too. This is basic inductive reasoning.

The "Bob is not conscious" model is not solipsism. Science still applies, and everything still exists - except for Consciousness_Bob. If the model contains no contradictions, then studying consciousness in a scientific way becomes extremely difficult. In particular, I have no way of testing whether something is conscious.

Yes, it is. Let's quote the Wiki, shall we:

Solipsism (from Latin solus, meaning "alone", and ipse, meaning "self") is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside of the mind. As a metaphysical position, solipsism goes further to the conclusion that the world and other minds do not exist.

That does seem to fit your stance rather well, doesn't it?

Science may not currently explain Bob's behavior, but it can in theory. If you disagree, you seem to believe that there's something acausal about free will.

Science can explain Bob's behaviour. It can also explain yours, using the same assumptions. It follows then that, on sxome level, you and Bob are more or less indistinguishable.

See my definition of Consciousness_Me. Bob and I both exist.

Yes, but you have explicitly said that while you assume yourself to be conscious, no such assumption can be made for others; All we're asking is why you believe your assumption about yourself to be true.

"Reducing others' consciousness" presupposes that the notion of others' consciousness is coherent. Bob may make the same statements I make, but his statements may not even make sense. Furthermore (unless free will is acausal), I can theoretically use reductive arguments to explain why he makes those statements.

If Bob makes the same arguments you do, but Bob's do not make sense, then it follows that your arguments do not make sense either.

The only justification you've offered for positing others' consciousness is a massive extrapolation: based on a sample size of one (myself), I draw conclusions about a population of seven billion, and that's when I only consider human beings. Against Occam's Razor, this reasoning seems flimsy.

And the assumption that you alone are the only conscious entity in the universe somehow fulfills Occam's simplicity criterion isn't flimsy?

[GhylTarvoke]

Then explain why people under the influence of drugs behave differently compared to when they are sober.

The difference between stoned Bob's behavior and sober Bob's behavior can be explained purely by reductive reasoning. Asking about the difference between Consciousness_{Stoned Bob} and Consciousness_{Sober Bob} only makes sense if I assume a model in which Bob is conscious.

There is plenty of medical research, and quite a few successful product lines, based around the idea that human brains are similar enough that drugs will produce reproducable effects. Therefore, we have to assume that human brains share properties, and that if something is true for one brain, it will be true for any number of other brains as well.

Following from that, since we know that brains and consciousness are intimately connected, we have to assume that if one brain is conscious, others have to be too. This is basic inductive reasoning.

This is question-begging. Your reasoning only applies if I assume a model in which other people are conscious.

Yes, it is. Let's quote the Wiki, shall we:

Solipsism (from Latin solus, meaning "alone", and ipse, meaning "self") is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside of the mind. As a metaphysical position, solipsism goes further to the conclusion that the world and other minds do not exist.

That does seem to fit your stance rather well, doesn't it?

Yes, you're right. I should have said that my stance isn't metaphysical solipsism.

Science can explain Bob's behaviour. It can also explain yours, using the same assumptions. It follows then that, on sxome level, you and Bob are more or less indistinguishable.

Science can indeed explain my behavior (where "my" refers to the locus of Consciousness_Me). Bob and I are distinguishable because I am the locus of Consciousness_Me, whereas Bob is not.

Yes, but you have explicitly said that while you assume yourself to be conscious, no such assumption can be made for others; All we're asking is why you believe your assumption about yourself to be true.

Consciousness_Me exists by definition. I define "me" to be the locus of Consciousness_Me. But I can't prove to you that I am conscious, and vice versa.

If Bob makes the same arguments you do, but Bob's do not make sense, then it follows that your arguments do not make sense either.

If Bob defines "me" to be the locus of Consciousness_Me, then his argument makes sense. If he defines "me" to be the locus of Consciousness_Bob, then his argument may not make sense.

And the assumption that you alone are the only conscious entity in the universe somehow fulfills Occam's simplicity criterion isn't flimsy?

Your model posits the existence of seven billion entities that explain nothing. If that doesn't qualify for Occam's Razor, I don't know what does.

[The E]

The difference between stoned Bob's behavior and sober Bob's behavior can be explained purely by reductive reasoning. Asking about the difference between Consciousness_{Stoned Bob} and Consciousness_{Sober Bob} only makes sense if I assume a model in which Bob is conscious.

And what happens when you take drugs? Do they have similar effects on you?

This is question-begging. Your reasoning only applies if I assume a model in which other people are conscious.

No, it applies if your physiological makeup is more or less identical to that of an entity you presume to be unconscious. Which it is. To a ridiculous degree.

So, to restate: Assuming you have a brain, and assuming that altering your brain alters your consciousness in ways similar to the alterations observed when another's brain is so altered, then it follows that there are similar mechanisms at work. Since it is undeniable that the brain is the seat of your consciousness, and since it is provable that other people have brains of largely similar construction and complexity, you have to prove that you are in some way fundamentally different to others for your assumptions to work.

Basically, if you start with the axiom that you are conscious and then hypothesize that others aren't, you need to identify the key difference between you and others. You have so far failed to do so; despite your proclaimed beliefs in the scientific method, you aren't following it.

Science can indeed explain my behavior (where "my" refers to the locus of Consciousness_Me). Bob and I are distinguishable because I am the locus of Consciousness_Me, whereas Bob is not.

Sure. But the seat of your consciousness, if extracted from its skullprison, is indistinguishable from Bob's. We can do fine structure scans and see differences in the connectome, but overall, the differences are really minor and not enough to explain why you should be conscious and he isn't.

Consciousness_Me exists by definition. I define "me" to be the locus of Consciousness_Me. But I can't prove to you that I am conscious, and vice versa.

Of course you can. Just do things while I am sleeping.

If Bob defines "me" to be the locus of Consciousness_Me, then his argument makes sense. If he defines "me" to be the locus of Consciousness_Bob, then his argument may not make sense.

No, let's posit this. Bob makes the exact same statements you have made. He puts forth the same arguments you put forth to prove that he, not you, is the only conscious entity present. What do you do? Do you prove him wrong? Do you agree with him? Do you two get into a big fight about who the conscious one in this relationship is?

Your model posits the existence of seven billion entities that explain nothing. If that doesn't qualify for Occam's Razor, I don't know what does.

But they explain a whole lot of things. For example, the appearance of roads in my vicinity. Or parking tickets. I can prove to my satisfaction that the house I am in exists. I can further prove that I had nothing to do with its construction. Therefore, other agencies must be present, and astonishingly, there are entities all around me that are fundamentally similar to me, that share many of my qualities and therefore can be safely assumed to be grossly similar to me. Thus I have proven to my satisfaction that consciousness is a universal quality found in many different places.


I would like to ask you something though. If we buy into your theory, that you are the only conscious being in the universe, why do you wear clothes?

[GhylTarvoke]

And what happens when you take drugs? Do they have similar effects on you?

If I take drugs, the difference in behavior between stoned me and sober me can be explained by reductive reasoning. The change in Consciousness_Me can also be explained by reductive reasoning: based on previous observations, there's a strong connection between Consciousness_Me and its locus.

No, it applies if your physiological makeup is more or less identical to that of an entity you presume to be unconscious. Which it is. To a ridiculous degree.

So, to restate: Assuming you have a brain, and assuming that altering your brain alters your consciousness in ways similar to the alterations observed when another's brain is so altered, then it follows that there are similar mechanisms at work. Since it is undeniable that the brain is the seat of your consciousness, and since it is provable that other people have brains of largely similar construction and complexity, you have to prove that you are in some way fundamentally different to others for your assumptions to work.

Basically, if you start with the axiom that you are conscious and then hypothesize that others aren't, you need to identify the key difference between you and others. You have so far failed to do so; despite your proclaimed beliefs in the scientific method, you aren't following it.

Yes, Bob and I are extremely similar. If my brain is altered, I can observe the effects on both my behavior and Consciousness_Me in general. If Bob's brain is altered, I can observe the effects on Bob's behavior, but saying that I can observe the effects on Consciousness_Bob is wrong on two counts. First, the statement presupposes that Bob is conscious; second, even if Qualia_Bob exist, they cannot be Qualia_Me, which prevents me from "observing" them.

The key difference between me and Bob is that I am the locus of Consciousness_Me, whereas Bob is not. Science says nothing about the existence of Consciousness_Bob. I can neither prove nor disprove it.

Sure. But the seat of your consciousness, if extracted from its skullprison, is indistinguishable from Bob's. We can do fine structure scans and see differences in the connectome, but overall, the differences are really minor and not enough to explain why you should be conscious and he isn't.

Asking why Consciousness_Me exists is the same as asking why anything exists. Answering the question is impossible and unnecessary. To explain why Consciousness_Bob might not exist, I need only demonstrate the possibility of its nonexistence, which is exactly what the solipsist model demonstrates.

Consciousness_Me exists by definition. I define "me" to be the locus of Consciousness_Me. But I can't prove to you that I am conscious, and vice versa.

Of course you can. Just do things while I am sleeping.

I'm not sure what this would prove. You seem to be using the pedestrian definition of "consciousness".

No, let's posit this. Bob makes the exact same statements you have made. He puts forth the same arguments you put forth to prove that he, not you, is the only conscious entity present. What do you do? Do you prove him wrong? Do you agree with him? Do you two get into a big fight about who the conscious one in this relationship is?

I can't prove him wrong, nor can I prove him correct.

Suppose he makes exactly the same statements I've made. Suppose I also assume that his speech carries meaning. What could he mean by Consciousness_Me? If he and I are referring to the same entity, then Bob's argument makes sense. Otherwise, he's referring to something that may not exist, so his argument may not make sense.

But they explain a whole lot of things. For example, the appearance of roads in my vicinity. Or parking tickets. I can prove to my satisfaction that the house I am in exists. I can further prove that I had nothing to do with its construction. Therefore, other agencies must be present, and astonishingly, there are entities all around me that are fundamentally similar to me, that share many of my qualities and therefore can be safely assumed to be grossly similar to me. Thus I have proven to my satisfaction that consciousness is a universal quality found in many different places.

The existence of roads, parking tickets, my house, and even other people is not in dispute. As for the similarity argument, see above. It's nothing more than a massive extrapolation.

I would like to ask you something though. If we buy into your theory, that you are the only conscious being in the universe, why do you wear clothes?

The fact that I wear clothes can theoretically be explained by reductive reasoning, but that's probably not what you meant.

I don't believe in the solipsist model. If I did, I'd be in a mental institution instead of debating with you. What the solipsist model shows is that science and the existence of Consciousness_Bob are logically independent, which means that scientific investigation of consciousness has fundamental limits. In particular, I have no way of testing whether something is conscious.

[GhylTarvoke]

Anyway, if you accept that scientific investigation of consciousness is limited (and in particular, there's no way to test for consciousness), that doesn't mean consciousness is fundamentally different from everything else. "In reality", consciousness and other phenomena may hold the same status. My argument only shows that this claim is independent of science.

[The E]

The existence of roads, parking tickets, my house, and even other people is not in dispute. As for the similarity argument, see above. It's nothing more than a massive extrapolation.

Explain why any of these things exist, then.

I don't believe in the solipsist model. If I did, I'd be in a mental institution instead of debating with you. What the solipsist model shows is that science and the existence of Consciousness_Bob are logically independent, which means that scientific investigation of consciousness has fundamental limits. In particular, I have no way of testing whether something is conscious.

Only if you subscribe to the idea that consciousness is unexplainable. I do not. I strongly believe that given time, it is possible to fully map the processes running in a mammalian brain, and that we'll find consciousness to be an emergent property of sufficiently complex neural networks (with the lower bound for complexity probably being far lower than we would think).

That's the big problem your model has: By declaring yourself to be conscious, your argument essentially becomes "If consciousness is a quality of me, and other people are not me, then I cannot be sure they're conscious". You make no attempt to explain the hows and whys of consciousness, you accept it as a given. The solipsistic model isn't useful in any way, because it does not provide a framework to examine yourself. In it, objectivity is unattainable and science (or rather, the scientific method) cannot be used to explain yourself to you.

[GhylTarvoke]

The existence of roads, parking tickets, my house, and even other people is not in dispute. As for the similarity argument, see above. It's nothing more than a massive extrapolation.

Explain why any of these things exist, then.

They exist as combinations of Qualia_Me. If you're asking whether they "really" exist, this is a metaphysical question about the nature of reality.

I strongly believe that given time, it is possible to fully map the processes running in a mammalian brain, and that we'll find consciousness to be an emergent property of sufficiently complex neural networks (with the lower bound for complexity probably being far lower than we would think).

If by "consciousness" you mean Consciousness_L for some locus L, then the claim "consciousness is an emergent property of sufficiently complex neural networks" is untestable and independent of science. If you mean something else, then I agree.

That's the big problem your model has: By declaring yourself to be conscious, your argument essentially becomes "If consciousness is a quality of me, and other people are not me, then I cannot be sure they're conscious". You make no attempt to explain the hows and whys of consciousness, you accept it as a given.

Not accepting Consciousness_Me as a given is the same as denying that something certainly exists. If you truly believe it's possible that nothing exists, then I can't help you.

The solipsistic model isn't useful in any way, because it does not provide a framework to examine yourself. In it, objectivity is unattainable and science (or rather, the scientific method) cannot be used to explain yourself to you.

Any scientific argument that goes through in the "Bob is conscious" model also goes through in the solipsistic model. Science explains the behavior of "me", and it also explains the behavior of Consciousness_Me. Science says nothing about the existence or behavior of Consciousness_Bob.

[The E]

If by "consciousness" you mean Consciousness_L for some locus L, then the claim "consciousness is an emergent property of sufficiently complex neural networks" is untestable and independent of science. If you mean something else, then I agree.

I am not going to mess up perfectly good words with subscript madness. Defining consciousness as the result of a sufficiently capable neural net backed by large enough memory storage capacity to enable the gathering and evaluation of experiential data that is processing inputs into outputs is a perfectly sufficient and testable definition of consciousness, and that is the one I subscribe to.

Not accepting Consciousness_Me as a given is the same as denying that something certainly exists. If you truly believe it's possible that nothing exists, then I can't help you.

Where, in this entire topic, have I ever even come close to the idea that nothing exists?

My criticism of your starting point is that you declare something to be axiomatically true that doesn't need to be. By using a completely physicalist definition of consciousness, I can devise tests to see if something is conscious, I can even arrive at a complete model of it and replicate it. In your approach, you seemingly throw your hands in the air and say that science is great, but there's this barrier right here that it can't cross. It is no wonder then that you cannot prove another's consciousness exists; You can't even prove that you are conscious (Just as we cannot prove that |x| + |y| > |x| and |x| + |y| > |y|). Solipsism, to me, is intellectually lazy. It's a capitulation.

Any scientific argument that goes through in the "Bob is conscious" model also goes through in the solipsistic model. Science explains the behavior of "me", and it also explains the behavior of Consciousness_Me. Science says nothing about the existence or behavior of Consciousness_Bob.

Except it does if you're not using a solipsistic model.

[GhylTarvoke]

I am not going to mess up perfectly good words with subscript madness. Defining consciousness as the result of a sufficiently capable neural net backed by large enough memory storage capacity to enable the gathering and evaluation of experiential data that is processing inputs into outputs is a perfectly sufficient and testable definition of consciousness, and that is the one I subscribe to.

"Consciousness" is an extremely overloaded word; the subscripts make my meaning precise. I agree that science can eventually explain consciousness by your definition. However, the solipsistic model shows that science says nothing about Consciousness_Bob. So here are your choices:

1. You can either accept or not accept the definition of Consciousness_Me. If you don't accept it, then you deny that something exists. Let's assume you accept it.
2. You can either accept or not accept the definition of Consciousness_Bob. If you don't accept it, then you're in the solipsistic model. Let's assume you accept it.
3. You can either consider or not consider the question: "Is science independent of Consciousness_Bob?" If you don't consider it, then you're sticking your head in the sand. If you do consider it, then the solipsistic model shows that the answer is "yes".

Where, in this entire topic, have I ever even come close to the idea that nothing exists?

My criticism of your starting point is that you declare something to be axiomatically true that doesn't need to be. By using a completely physicalist definition of consciousness, I can devise tests to see if something is conscious, I can even arrive at a complete model of it and replicate it. In your approach, you seemingly throw your hands in the air and say that science is great, but there's this barrier right here that it can't cross. It is no wonder then that you cannot prove another's consciousness exists; You can't even prove that you are conscious (Just as we cannot prove that |x| + |y| > |x| and |x| + |y| > |y|). Solipsism, to me, is intellectually lazy. It's a capitulation.

Regarding the definition of consciousness, see above. Consciousness_Me exists by definition, so "proving its existence" makes no sense.

Again, I don't believe in the solipsistic model (though I have no justification for my disbelief). It's a tool that demonstrates the independence of science and Consciousness_Bob.

Except it does if you're not using a solipsistic model.

If science "explains" Consciousness_Bob in the "Bob is conscious" model, then it also does so in the solipsistic model. But Consciousness_Bob doesn't even exist in the solipsistic model, so this is a contradiction.

[The E]

1. You can either accept or not accept the definition of Consciousness_Me. If you don't accept it, then you deny that something exists. Let's assume you accept it.
2. You can either accept or not accept the definition of Consciousness_Bob. If you don't accept it, then you're in the solipsistic model. Let's assume you accept it.

I do not accept your definitions, plural. I do not "deny the existance of something". I do not accept your initial setup as valid, and consider it to be deeply flawed and misguided. In case that wasn't clear enough already.
 

3. You can either consider or not consider the question: "Is science independent of Consciousness_Bob?" If you don't consider it, then you're sticking your head in the sand. If you do consider it, then the solipsistic model shows that the answer is "yes".

I considered the question. I considered the setup. I found your setup to be flawed on a conceptual level, and thus conclusions drawn from it to be similarly invalid.

Regarding the definition of consciousness, see above. Consciousness_Me exists by definition, so "proving its existence" makes no sense.

Oh for ****'s sake.

Let's be absolutely clear here: Your setup defines consciousness as an intrinsic quality of you, and you alone. By that definition, sure, no statements can be made about others. But that definition is deeply, fatally, flawed, as pointed out above. You are trying to win this argument by forcing everyone to play by the rules you set up, and if I or someone else points out to you that your rules are not making sense and do not lead to a place that allows for meaningful inquiry about the hows and whys of human cognition, you keep retreating to your definition.

This isn't fun. Not for me, not for anyone else still reading this topic, I imagine.

What exactly are you trying to learn here anyway? What is the point of this discussion? What are your goals for it?
 

Again, I don't believe in the solipsistic model (though I have no justification for my disbelief). It's a tool that demonstrates the independence of science and Consciousness_Bob.

No, it's not a tool. It's a desire to not have to deal with others dressed up in pretty philosophical language (in this regard, it shares qualities with libertarianism).

If science "explains" Consciousness_Bob in the "Bob is conscious" model, then it also does so in the solipsistic model. But Consciousness_Bob doesn't even exist in the solipsistic model, so this is a contradiction.

Which is why the solipsistic model is invalid.