I'd also note that the aircraft carrier didn't immediately change the equation of the need for battleships as a counterforce to other battleships, and nor did the submarine. Submarines and aircraft are, in essence, weapons of sea denial. They can make an area unsafe for the enemy, but their respective limitations mean they can't really make it safe for the passage of your forces. That was good enough to starve an island nation like the UK or Japan, but it would not suffice against Germany or the United States. Surface ships are required to take and hold water much as infantry are required to take and hold ground. (Hence why carriers have escorts.) There was a time before the carrier was able to sweep away enemy surface craft reliably and with little danger.
The turning point is about mid-1943, as the tools and doctrine of the aircraft carrier were not yet sufficiently developed before that to render them safe against a fast battleship making a run in under cover of darkness from outside the range of their strike and recon aircraft. (Spruance avoided this very fate at Midway explicitly over the objections of his carrier commanders, while Hornet, if it hadn't already been a blazing hulk, would have become one rather quickly at Santa Cruz. The repeated Japanese bombardments of Guadalcanal also offer good evidence that the range of aircraft was not quite sufficient to always catch enemy ships in the open.) Even if only to defend the carriers against others of their kind in a night engagement, they had a purpose and a place until then.
After that, though, the equivalent tonnage in destroyers would have been a better use.