Yawn... I'm getting bored so here goes...
I know you love philosophical arguments, CP5670, so I'll give you one
Argument from contingency:
1. If something exists, there must exist what it takes for that thing to exist.
2. The universe exists.
3. Thus there must exist what it takes for the universe to exist.
4. What it takes for the universe to exist cannot exist within the universe or be bounded by space and time.
5. Therefore, what it takes for the universe to exist must transcend both space and time.
Suppose you deny (1). Then you would be saying then if X exists, there not exist what it takes for it to exist. But what it takes for X to exist is a condition for X to exist.
What if you deny (4)? We notice that some things cause other things to be (eg a man playing music). If he stops, so does the music. Now suppose that there is no uncaused being, no God. Then nothing could exist right now.
Then you might say why do we need an uncaused cause?
Take the example of a drunkard. He probably cant stand on his own. But a group of drunkards supporting each other might stand. Note however, we could not understand them being upgright without any ground. Things have to exist in order to be mutually dependent. A causing B, B causing C, C causing A is absurd.
Then you might say that the universe is infinitely old. Which brings us to the Kalam argument.
Can an infinite task ever be done or completed? If, in order to reach the end, infinitely many steps had to precede it. Could the end be reached? Of course not-even with infinite time. For an infinite time would be unending, just as the steps would be. In other words, no end would ever be reached. What about steps before the end? Could they be reached? If the task is really infinite, then an infinity of steps must have preceded it. In fact no step could ever be reached, because an infinity of steps must be preceded by any step, and must have gone one by one before it. The problem comes from supposing that an infinite sequence could reach, by temporal succession, any point at all.
