[Beskargam]

So I finally got around to reading this most intriguing book that GB told me to read something like 8 months ago. It details the marine first recon battalion on its tour in Iraq. it is very interesting, but as I have never served in the military, I lack knowledge and context for much of this information. So i have a lot of questions/ discussion points. If I step on anybodies toes, I apologize in advance, I do not mean to offend.
    -why is the first recon battalion being used to hunt out ambushes in Humvees by driving into them? first why are they using humvees and not APCs? from what I know the humvee was never designed for that role, and is overarmoured and underpowered. supposed to be the successor to the jeep, not a combat vehicle? also why use the recon marines in vehichles, not the Light Armored Recon Battalions which are trained to fight through ambushes in vehicles?
    - can somebody explain Maneuver warfare and its strengths/weaknesses? it seems like a poor choice for an invasion and then an OCCUPATION of a country, as the troops would then not be equipped to handle the occupation. Major General Mattis's plans were for the invasion and the utilization of the first recon were not told the commander of the forces that would be going in until 2 months till the invasion. is that standard operating procedure? also is Mattis competent? this book makes him sound like a blustering cowboy, but this is biased and I am wondering if anybody knows anything else to the contrary. furthermore, the marines were not told of their job to go ambush hunting even while they were in Iraq going ambush hunting. is that also standard operating procedure? also the lieutenant colonel is a desk officer on his first combat deployment sent to lead combat troops? isnt that bad? is that normal/happen a lot? on the night before the invasion, he is concerned about the marines having shaved their mustaches or not?!
    -how does the military handle ROE, in what its doctrine says, and how it actuall works out in real time?
    -why was a blitz attack used when (I dont know anything about what follows in this line) the Iraqi military was mostly junk anyway and easily rolled over by the US? why not a different strategy that would be more stable long term?
    -MOPPs sound like they are inefficient, bulky, really hot (bad idea in the middle of a desert?),  poor planned out for the field, and it sounds like it would be next to impossible to fight in. someone chime in about how good or bad these are? cause I'm assuming they at least do their job of preventing gas/chemical weapons deaths.

   thats all for now. will have more later

[Dilmah G]

RE: most of those, the military isn't as efficient and well-equipped as you think it is. Nor is it a machine very adaptable to doctrinal change and evolution (in some parts and levels) and some lessons are forgotten as time goes on. Also on a minor note to one of your points, there was a lack of solid intelligence on things like the Iraqi Air Force and I'd assume the Army as well prior to the invasion, and so that could explain why this was waged as a conventional conflict/with some now odd-seeming tactics at the beginning.

[Davros]

as to ambush hunting I take this as humvee acting as bait you wouldnt use an acp because its less likely to be attacked

ps: manoever warfare
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maneuver_warfare

[Beskargam]

RE: most of those, the military isn't as efficient and well-equipped as you think it is. Nor is it a machine very adaptable to doctrinal change and evolution (in some parts and levels) and some lessons are forgotten as time goes on. Also on a minor note to one of your points, there was a lack of solid intelligence on things like the Iraqi Air Force and I'd assume the Army as well prior to the invasion, and so that could explain why this was waged as a conventional conflict/with some now odd-seeming tactics at the beginning.

    guess I thought the military was a well oiled machine kind of thing. the book makes the whole invasion sound like a cluster****. anybody able to provide any other perspective on that? also the lack of intell would make sense. explains how things went down i suppose.

as to ambush hunting I take this as humvee acting as bait you wouldnt use an acp because its less likely to be attacked

    point. but in general why was the humvee used so much instead of APCs in Iraq and Afghanistan? and why use the recon battalion? *doesnt understand*

[The E]

Because Recon troops are supposed to be trained for being the first ones into dangerous zones?

[Beskargam]

they're trained to fight on foot, without a lot of armor and heavy weapons. They're not vehichle drives/trained to do so. they're trained to be spec ops kinda guys, behind enemy lines and all that. I could see them looking for ambushes on foot, which would make sense, but not in Humvees. they also had alternate battalions, including a light armored one, which was specifically trained to hunt ambushes by driving into them in vehicles.  *all of this is my understanding and could be wrong*

[Kosh]

-why is the first recon battalion being used to hunt out ambushes in Humvees by driving into them? first why are they using humvees and not APCs? from what I know the humvee was never designed for that role, and is overarmoured and underpowered. supposed to be the successor to the jeep, not a combat vehicle? also why use the recon marines in vehichles, not the Light Armored Recon Battalions which are trained to fight through ambushes in vehicles?

For one thing the Army was almost totally un prepared for counter insurgency. The occupation of Iraq was poorly planned and the Humvees didnt have enough armor to do the job. For quite a while there was a huge shortage of uparmor kits, so much so that families of servicemen were sending over scrap metal from junk yards.

[Dilmah G]

Yeah, really if you get into this genre you'll find that generally in wars and combat just by nature, everything is a gigantic cluster****. 'No battle plan survives contact with the enemy' is far more true than you think it is. And agreed on the COIN point, it's shameful that it's taken this long for us to learn our lessons in COIN but then again, Iraq was different in some respects.

Also Beskargam, if you want to read up about Counter-insurgency and get into the more recent titles in this genre, I'd highly recommend 'The Accidental Guerrilla' by David Kilcullen. Sure I'm biased because I'm an Aussie too, but it's a good book.

On the HUMVEE point: probably because there are more HUMVEES than armoured hunks. I'm not even joking. Even after these lessons are learned I wouldn't be surprised if the simple 'this is what we have, go do your jobs' line applies to those poor buggers. Reading so much of this crap, even I'm surprised at just how...silly some of this stuff goes down. But I guess what you've got to remember is that these blokes, officers, are the same youths who manage fast-food stores, run small businesses, do trades, and stick it out in college, and so in many ways some of what goes down resembles such fields far more closely than anyone would like to think. To run the show they simply make do with what they've got, and most of the time they do a stellar job considering.

[mxlm]

For one thing the Army was almost totally un prepared for counter insurgency. The occupation of Iraq was poorly planned and the Humvees didnt have enough armor to do the job. For quite a while there was a huge shortage of uparmor kits, so much so that families of servicemen were sending over scrap metal from junk yards.

He's talking about the invasion.

[Beskargam]

He's talking about the invasion.
[/quote]
yes.

also thanks for the info dilma. will read that book once i finish generation kill.  and the fact that the troops do so well considering is a good point to keep in mind, thanks again.

[Beskargam]

double post.

how common is it in the military to have a non combat officer leading combat troops into combat? people who have served administrative wise or something

[Dilmah G]

It depends - usually it just happens as a result of the posting cycle, because everyone is posted to somewhere different (including job most/some of the time) every 3 years. If someone who graduates as an Infantry Officer but gets consecutive staff/non-combat unit postings, they're still liable to be able to lead a Rifle Platoon/Company if they're posted there.

It's not so much a matter of them being ADMINO's but just receiving non-combat postings, they're still specialists as rifle platoon leaders and the like. It's just the nature of the system that this sometimes happens, to my understanding.

[Kosh]

Yeah, really if you get into this genre you'll find that generally in wars and combat just by nature, everything is a gigantic cluster****. 'No battle plan survives contact with the enemy' is far more true than you think it is. And agreed on the COIN point, it's shameful that it's taken this long for us to learn our lessons in COIN but then again, Iraq was different in some respects.

Also Beskargam, if you want to read up about Counter-insurgency and get into the more recent titles in this genre, I'd highly recommend 'The Accidental Guerrilla' by David Kilcullen. Sure I'm biased because I'm an Aussie too, but it's a good book.

Actually to give some idea as to the extent of screw up I strongly suggest you see this when you have the chance. It isn't just a matter of "no battle plan survives contact with the enemy", it's the fact that because of horrendously niave and overly optimistic assumptions about the Iraqi political environment post-Saddam they didn't think there would be an insurgency at all in the first place.