No upcoming 'precision strike toy' (what an apt phrase) will solve the structural issues that cause the problems described in Dirty Wars. Each nascent system will come with its own drawbacks and its own vast terrain of policy pitfalls and doctrinal concerns to navigate. The ability to selectively target may grow; the ability to know who to target, and to assess whether that sanction actually works towards strategic objectives, is going to lag far, far behind.
No ISR asset helped us make the right decision with the Islamic Courts. No long-loiter interdiction capability stopped us from being manipulated by Saleh. No satellite platform saved civilians at Gardez.
The dream of sanitized warfare has lived on since before World War II, carried by torchbearers as disparate as MacNamara and Tom Clancy. It's always twenty years out, always a capability we'll have in the next conflict. The reality we find, again and again, is that these enhanced tactical capabilities don't save us from strategic mistakes, that the most powerful determinants of success are human and institutional factors, and that a good set of linguists and historians achieve more than any number of Nth-generation low-footprint Rumsfeldwaffen.