[Luis Dias]

I think these things are as testable as whether we'll still be ourselves tomorrow, which is the only criteria we need. If I sound poetical it's because our ideas of 'self', 'dying', 'consciousness' and so on are just poetry — dressed-up terms to disguise the fact that we're reels of film.

But surely you see the problem there: whenever terms are poetic, that means we have no real synthetic / scientific grasp on them, let alone engineeringly-wise. I see this as a gradient from "Mere Intuition - > Insight -> Poetic semantics -> Insight -> Philosophizing -> Pre-scientific terminology -> Insight -> More grounded Philosophizing -> Hypothesis -> Testability, testing, tinkering, empirical feedback -> Scientific terminology -> Technical insight -> Engineering -> Technology".

When you tell me to dismiss all this poetic language because what "we really are" (which is a phrase that should be followed by some technical thing) is reels of film, just shows how deep into the Plato Cave's shadows we really are in discussing these things. No, we're not "reels of film", although I do get your "poetic point" - isn't it all we have at this point anyway?

I do not share your fear that living on through teleporters is like living on through your work. If you rebuild the object, you rebuild the subject. This is not just an untestable article of faith but the default conclusion of every single piece of evidence we have about the universe. I do not see any risk to the philosophical teleporter.

You are claiming that the continuation of my own Consciousness, that prima facie can be said to be stuck inside this brain of mine, can be followed through the destruction and re-building of the support of it, anywhere, any time. That's fine. What's not fine is your claim that this is "the default conclusion". As established by whom? As tested by whom? How can you ever test this thing?

To recap, let's just focus on the testability of this. Imagine two possible metaphysics here:

1. Consciousness works like you say and you can transfer it through teleportation (let's ignore the unanswered murder aspects):

    a. I go to a room, my brain and body is scanned;
    b. I'm immediately executed, and the information is passed through a channell to its proper place;
    c. A clone is built and all the required information is inserted;
    d. This clone wakes up and you ask this clone: "Who are you, and are you really *you*, the one who just came from the other side?"
    e. The clone wll answer unequivocally ""Of course I am, I feel myself, I am conscious, I remember I was just scanned and here I am now, now let me go to my business will you?"

2. Consciousness does *not* work like you say, but it is "copiable". In this metaphysical scenario, every time you kill a brain, you kill a Conscience:

    a. I go to a room, my brain and body is scanned;
    b. I'm immediately executed, and the information is passed through a channell to its proper place;
    c. A clone is built and all the required information is inserted;
    d. This clone wakes up and you ask this clone: "Who are you, and are you really *you*, the one who just came from the other side?"
    e. The clone wll answer unequivocally ""Of course I am, I feel myself, I am conscious, I remember I was just scanned and here I am now, now let me go to my business will you?"

There's no way to distinguish both scenarios. There's no way to test it. And that's why you'll be left with mere beliefs. Always. But science is not dealing with beliefs. It deals with predictions and tests. Replication. Falsification. None of what you have said meet these criteria, therefore it is not Science, it is just... your beliefs.

[General Battuta]

But surely you see the problem there: whenever terms are poetic, that means we have no real synthetic / scientific grasp on them, let alone engineeringly-wise. I see this as a gradient from "Mere Intuition - > Insight -> Poetic semantics -> Insight -> Philosophizing -> Pre-scientific terminology -> Insight -> More grounded Philosophizing -> Hypothesis -> Testability, testing, tinkering, empirical feedback -> Scientific terminology -> Technical insight -> Engineering -> Technology".

When you tell me to dismiss all this poetic language because what "we really are" (which is a phrase that should be followed by some technical thing) is reels of film, just shows how deep into the Plato Cave's shadows we really are in discussing these things. No, we're not "reels of film", although I do get your "poetic point" - isn't it all we have at this point anyway?

There are lots of words and concepts that refer to useful human abstractions — things that aren't real, but which represent concepts it's not useful to reduce to their actual components. 'Morality', for instance, is easier to talk about than 'sets of rules which, when obeyed, produce socially adaptive behavior.' 'Society' is easier to talk about than 'networks of human interaction which do not exist outside of individuals but appear to have influence on behavior that goes beyond the individual.' See where I'm rolling? 'Consciousness' is a lot easier to say than 'the retrospective illusion of continuity created by memory.'

There's no way to distinguish both scenarios. There's no way to test it. And that's why you'll be left with mere beliefs. Always. But science is not dealing with beliefs. It deals with predictions and tests. Replication. Falsification. None of what you have said meet these criteria, therefore it is not Science, it is just... your beliefs.

These are cleanly designed scenarios, and I wholly understand your point, but I think this actually points back to the utility of ~my model~. Consciousness is always claimed retrospectively. It is never claimed prospectively. It doesn't matter whether A or B is true: they are the same! The only valid claim of consciousness we ever experience is a 'copy' looking backwards and saying 'Yes, I am still me.'

[Luis Dias]

e: Regarding the retrospective scenario, I'll ponder over it. I think it's an evasion of my point, but a clever one.

The only way you can arrive that conclusion is through deduction, but I don't see enough knowledge of the world to do such a thing. What I do recognize you doing is making a set of pressupositions based on some other pressupositions, make some good deductions and inferring (inducing) others less clear concepts into other concepts. I do think you're doing the best you can, but unless a proof comes that you aren't letting something "off the hook", I'm perfectly willing to believe there are millions of (unseen as yet) loopholes that could render your idea wrong.

See where I'm rolling? 'Consciousness' is a lot easier to say than 'the retrospective illusion of continuity created by memory.'

Thing is, the latter is gruesomely grotesque still. It assumes an illusion. It assumes someone is being "fooled". In an half-baked manner, the semantics point to Descartian theatrics, even if you didn't mean it to (obviously you didn't). You say "created by memory", and I get what you mean (different levels of memory, the most basic one giving you the impression of continuity, etc.), but these are merely low-level mechanisms. Leaves. Are you sure you are understanding the forest, or just clinging to the latest neuro-scientific findings to feel you have a grasp on what is going on?

I do think that this Being that Is, This Thing that I cannot but Be, isn't reflected anywhere in Science. I think that Science merely tells me how other things are related to this Being that Is Me, how the world around me can affect me through material ends, whatever. I will admit it will even say how the "Me" works, in a physical manner. It will predict my behavior and all my experiences. But I'm still Me, and that experience is ineffable from the scientific point of view.

(I said this previously, but) I do think there are some paths to poke this apparently unbreakable gap, and we will arrive to very curious experiments in that direction in a couple of decades.

[General Battuta]

I think our disagreements are clear. I'd like to hear your thoughts about experiments!

I was going to ask Ghyl what he thought of the Cotard delusion and knowing for sure that you don't exist.

[General Battuta]

This is a good threadnaught.

[GhylTarvoke]

I can't believe I now find it necessary to address the meaning of the word "is".

The point he's making is that Consciousness is a product of the Brain, it's a physical process that happens within the Brain.

Then Battuta is not being clear or even honest when he says "consciousness is the brain". If he means, "consciousness is a product of the brain", then I agree 100%; I have never said otherwise.

Indeed.  A brain is not a consciousness.

Hooray!

It answers the question nose on. We begin with 1, proceed to 2, between 2 and 3 we conduct a search for systems of logic that use 1 and 2 to explain our perceptions. We stumble on mathematics, physics, and all their consequences: the belief in an objective reality that obeys causal logic. We reach 3 knowing that brains are consciousness: the existence of brains is the same as the existence of consciousness. We are our brains, and whatever we are is material. Any brute facts of our existence are material. The entire universe and all its rules are physical. Failing to accept this sends us back to the search between 2 and 3, which we repeat, and find no better (necessary and sufficient) model to explain our own existence.

You are once again not addressing the post. Do you understand the concept of a proof? You have only three options, none of which you have yet taken: 1) show that the proof is not logically valid; 2) accept that "consciousness is the brain" is false; and 3) deny one of the assumptions.

... unless your postscript is your way of taking option 2. If so, we are finally making progress.

Even if we're digital simulations, we still have brains, the simulation is computing us as little blobs of flesh. Brains are as brutally factual (:megadeth:) as consciousness.

I was hoping we could avoid this, but I must now ask you to define "brain". I think this will reveal your error.

I was going to ask Ghyl what he thought of the Cotard delusion and knowing for sure that you don't exist.

The hint is in the name. If they do exist, then those people are deluded. What's the problem?

[General Battuta]

Then Battuta is not being clear or even honest when he says "consciousness is the brain". If he means, "consciousness is a product of the brain", then I agree 100%; I have never said otherwise.

This feels like sophistry. Consciousness is in the brain. It is only meat. It is entire physical.

You are once again not addressing the post. Do you understand the concept of a proof? You have only three options, none of which you have yet taken: 1) show that the proof is not logically valid; 2) accept that "consciousness is the brain" is false; and 3) deny one of the assumptions.

Writing five bullet points does not a proof make. Your logic's broken! I fixed it by pointing out that we can begin at a 'brute truth' and use that truth to derive a model of the universe which qualifies and corrects our starting point.

I was hoping we could avoid this, but I must now ask you to define "brain". I think this will reveal your error.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain

A brain is a brain. The substrate is irrelevant as long as the constituents behave functionally. This is elementary physicalism: what matters is not the raw stuff, the bits in the ship of Theseus, but their behavior. One atom can be exchanged for another. An atom can be exchanged for a nanite. A neuron can be replaced by a synthetic alternate or a simulation in a computer. It's all a brain.

This is why the teleporter is safe. Atoms are interchangeable.

The hint is in the name. If they do exist, then those people are deluded. What's the problem?

No. By your argument these people have access to a brute truth. The only thing they can be sure of is that they don't exist.

[GhylTarvoke]

Consciousness is in the brain.

This is a separate claim, which I'll address later. "Consciousness is the brain" is provably false (unless you take option 1 or 3), and you've been making that statement again and again.

Writing five bullet points does not a proof make. Your logic's broken! I fixed it by pointing out that we can begin at a 'brute truth' and use that truth to derive a model of the universe which qualifies and corrects our starting point.

Is this option 1? If so, please pinpoint the logical error in the proof. Again, when arguing against a proof, you only have three options. (Don't make me define "proof".)

I was hoping we could avoid this, but I must now ask you to define "brain". I think this will reveal your error.

A brain is a brain. The substrate is irrelevant as long as the constituents behave functionally. This is elementary physicalism: what matters is not the raw stuff, the bits in the ship of Theseus, but their behavior. One atom can be exchanged for another. An atom can be exchanged for a nanite. A neuron can be replaced by a synthetic alternate or a simulation in a computer. It's all a brain.

This is why the teleporter is safe. Atoms are interchangeable.

If your definition of a brain is seriously "a brain", I despair.

The hint is in the name. If they do exist, then those people are deluded. What's the problem?

No. By your argument these people have access to a brute truth. The only thing they can be sure of is that they don't exist.

There are only two brute truths: existence, and consciousness. I thought we agreed on this.

[General Battuta]

Your argument here is 'it's this way because I say it is'. Your proof isn't a proof, consciousness is wholly and only physical, we both know exactly what a brain is, and your 'brute truth' definition needs updating if it can't account for those whose conscious experience is a self-negating insistence that they don't exist. Apparently the brute truth is actually contingent on physical circumstances!

[General Battuta]

We've goalposted from 'teleporters might destroy your qualia' to debates about wording and definitions. What exactly are you reading in 'consciousness is the brain' if it's not 'consciousness is monist and physical'?

[General Battuta]

Actually I have good idea for another tack if we continue to make no progress here. It will involves ~TMS GUNS~

[GhylTarvoke]

No goalposts are moving. There are bigger fish to fry, but I didn't expect such a hangup on this fairly simple point.

You've made the following statement over and over, apparently using it as a mantra or a substitute for an actual argument: "Consciousness is the brain". (I don't feel like going back and counting the instances of this statement.) Hence, the truth of this statement is extremely relevant.

Definitions are absolutely necessary for discussion. I think we've succeeded in defining "consciousness" precisely, which is great. If your definition of "brain" is either "brain" or a link to a Wikipedia page, there's a serious problem, especially since you seem to be using the word in an unusual way.

Finally, you've once again taken a fourth option by saying, "it's not a proof". Are you really forcing me to define "proof" here? This is the foundation of logical argument.

[General Battuta]

What are you trying to discuss here? Dualism versus monism, or semantics? You know exactly what point I'm making about consciousness, and you have my objection to your proof: point 1 disproves itself as soon as you use it to examine the world. Engage or change topics.

What kind of dualist do you identify as, exactly?

[General Battuta]

Are you concerned that consciousness cannot be the brain because there are segments of the brain that are not functionally accessible to consciousness? That seems a perfectly fair clarification to me, if not exactly a major logical stumbling point — it's just a matter of how you parse the wording.

This is what I'd point to as clarification, from a way back:

"Consciousness is a calculation conducted by the human brain. Consciousness is the brain. This is the only logic."

I might even insert 'Calculations are physical processes in which inputs are manipulated to produce a result."

[GhylTarvoke]

What are you trying to discuss here? Dualism versus monism, or semantics? You know exactly what point I'm making about consciousness, and you have my objection to your proof: point 1 disproves itself as soon as you use it to examine the world. Engage or change topics.

What kind of dualist do you identify as, exactly?

I'm trying to discuss consciousness (or dualism vs. monism, if you like), but this is very difficult if we throw semantics out the window.

Phew, finally. Okay. I assume that by "point 1" you mean assumption 1, so you're taking the third option: namely, rejecting an assumption. (This rigmarole could have been avoided with the simple statement: "I reject assumption 1.") But as I said in the proof, we have now reached an impasse. If the words "existence", "consciousness", or "brain" are not meaningful, then the discussion ends immediately, and we've been talking about nothing this entire time.

I thought I knew what point you were making, but then "consciousness is the brain" completely confused me. I don't think you know what point I'm making, either. I still blame the language barrier.

I'd probably identify as a type-F dualist, the view in the OP. (Strangely enough, it's commonly called type-F monism, but I consider this a misnomer.) I don't view science's silence on the topics of existence and consciousness as a weakness; rather, I consider those topics to be strictly philosophical, and hence outside science's purview.

Are you concerned that consciousness cannot be the brain because there are segments of the brain that are not functionally accessible to consciousness? That seems a perfectly fair clarification to me, if not exactly a major logical stumbling point — it's just a matter of how you parse the wording.

This is what I'd point to as clarification, from a way back:

"Consciousness is a calculation conducted by the human brain. Consciousness is the brain. This is the only logic."

I might even insert 'Calculations are physical processes in which inputs are manipulated to produce a result."

This is not my concern at all. Consciousness and the brain aren't just different, they're in completely different categories. That they still manage to be intimately connected is the hard problem.
----------
As you predicted, I think this thread is rapidly approaching the point where we both say, "we'll never understand each other", and leave it at that, unless someone here understands both arguments and gives a translation. Nevertheless, I'm grateful for the discussion - it clarified my views, and I concede several points that you made regarding teleportation.

[General Battuta]

It a good thread.

I don't think there is a hard problem. I think the existence of a hard problem is a case of begging the question caused by a category error. In much the same way you see consciousness as in a separate category from the brain, I think that experiences and explanations are separate categories. Sure, we can't ever experience what it's like to be a bat, but we can come up with a complete and bounded account of how a bat brain works, and if we ran it in simulation or fabricated a brain and let it go, we would be certain we had real bat qualia. Hell, we might even be able to build a virtual machine inside our own brains to experience bat-ness in the first person!

I am a deflationizer. I think that all mental events are identical to and reducible to physical events.

[GhylTarvoke]

@Battuta: Even with my fear of mind machines (which you say is illogical, I know), I might consider experiencing a bat simulation.

I just now read your and Luis' exchange about teleportation. As you probably guessed, I'm mostly on Luis' side, but my feelings aren't very strong or clear in this regard.

GhylTarvoke: In the metaphor of the button and the circuitry, the brain is not the button and consciousness is not the circuitry.  Qualia, experiences, are the button.  The brain is the circuitry.  Consciousness is the outcome.

I've noticed that this is something you've continually misapplied as an argument in your favor that there must be something else.

@Scotty: At the risk of reopening this can of worms - I agree that consciousness is the light, but saying that qualia are the button makes no sense to me. Our mindsets may be irreconcilable.

[watsisname]

Excellent thread, everyone.  Very good job keeping it civil.

[Bobboau]

Consciousness is (as of the current state of technology) wholly dependent on a brain, but it is not a brain in the same way that a program is not a computer, it merely requires a computer to run, different hardware will run it just fine, though it it's not a perfect replica it might result in different executions. The program is a pattern it could be on a hard drive, or in memory or printed out on paper, like a circle, if you draw a circle with a pencil, the graphite is what the circle is made out of, but it is not the circle it's self. likewise, the neurons of your brain are the medium that your consciousness is written on but it is not the sum of the parts that make it up.

I see a lot of disagreements here and people are saying they are differences of belief but a lot of them seem to be more differences of semantics.

I think this is relevant to this thread

[AtomicClucker]

Depending on how one wishes to take, it almost reminds of Kant's discussion between synthetic and apriori (this discussion finally caused me to start reading up on consciousness and jumping back into Metaphysical knowledge). I'm a little rusty, but this vigorous discussion is refreshing.

Coming from my angle, I'm going to side with Battuta and agree that much of consciousness is a physical aspect that can be measured and to an extent, recreated with the same effects. As for the knowledge that is generated in consciousness? That's going to be a mix between synthetic (empirically drawn) and apriori (definitive drawn) knowledge. What's interesting is that certain aspects of consciousness is the ability to engage in knowledge, that is quite literally, outside of synthetic bounds - but quite inside - synthetic apriori. For example, we know that mathematics works and is true, but you can't necessarily experiment on it - it is in a Kantian sense, metaphsyical, but quite empirical despite having no physical properties. 1+1=2, even if it actually has no physical presence.

Going to say that the teleporter argument is an interesting principle - even if you're "killed" and "reborn" the sense of "you" persists, regardless of the question of conscience. Thanks for that video Bobbau, brought a warm fuzzy smile back. Between the ship of Theseus and my recent replay of Diaspora, all is good on dat ship.