Tirpitz kept a good chunk of the Royal Navy tied down in Scapa Flow when they could have been far more use in the Pacific.
Of course, before mid-1941 the German surface fleet was doing enough damage on its own without factoring in the U-Boats.
Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau were the two biggest pains of the lot and there was a fear that the
Bismarck, with her greater armament, could cause even more damage.
Raeder was still in charge at the time, and he was a warship man. It wasn't until Donitz got in after the
Bismarck fiasco that the really serious U-Boat building program began in earnest.
The third thing was that carriers had yet to prove themselves. Midway didn't occur until 1942, by which point all the major navies had been constructed on the old battleship-heavy doctrine. Few people still put faith in aircraft at sea, thinking that the big guns of their capital ships would solve problems.
Let us not forget that the Royal Navy sank the French fleet in harbour rather than let them be taken by the Germans. We didn't want them to have any more battleships than we could prevent them having.
