I did read it, and its the same thing being argued back and forth between the same people, with hardly a change except for the exact wording of the replies. It's not like I took anything away from the thread.
There are two opposing viewpoints, both based on purely hypothetical inference and/or guessing, and neither willing to admit the other might possibly be right.
I understand what he's saying too. I just disagree.
Nope, your above objections have actually all been concretely dealt with.
I'll take them apart again if you want, though.
The fundamental disagreement here is that Battuta seems to be treating each copy, clone, call it what you will as merely a bottle for continued consciousness. To be blunt, it doesn't work that way.
You've already taken a wrong turn here.
A copy is not a clone. If I made an instantaneous teleporter duplicate of you, you would be unable to determine which one was the original you.
You could not tell if the teleporter had generated a copy of you, or if you had been teleported, and a copy left behind.
How would you do it? How could you even begin? Answer that question.
In a manner of speaking, your consciousness will continue, but it won't be you, as in the original consciouness in the first place. The copy may start at the same place you left off, but it isn't you.
They will all start in the same place: at the moment of my birth. All the information that has come from that point up until the moment of copying is resident in all the copies. They are utterly indistinguishable to each other.
Say that Battuta Prime makes three copies. Each of those copies starts at the point in Battuta's life they were made. Then Battuta Prime dies. Now Battuta Prime, as a conscious entity, has ceased to exist in our frame of reference. Battuta Prime, I can guarantee you, will not give a damn about how well his copies are doing, because he will be dead. His copies may continue on as if nothing happened, but the point is irrelevent, since it matters nothing to the original consciousness. I rather enjoyed that example of two CPUs running the exact same process at the same time, since it illustrates nearly the same point.
There is a simple flaw in there. How did you determine which one was Battuta Prime?
They all insist, eagerly, that they are Battuta Prime, and that it is only a copy that has died.
(Next point)To clarify, since you seem to making a big point of all of this (ALL of you): The difference between gradual replacement and this is that during gradual replacement, at no point does the entirety of the being cease. Or even a tiny minority of the being. A good example would be playing with legos. Imagine you build a car/ship/what have you. Now imagine that you are replacing all the pieces of the structure a piece at a time. At no point in the process does the creation cease to be that creation. Now completely dismantle it. When you build it again, even if every piece is fundamentally the same, it is a different structure.
Not at all. Accelerate the timescale of the gradual replacement to ten seconds. Then to one second. Continue to narrow the window of the gradual replacement towards the Planck time interval.
Tell me where it stops being gradual and starts being instantaneous.
Now, you might say, 'it occurs past that point, when the whole system is simultaneously disassembled.' To which I respond: 'why should that be any different? We could pause your brain, pull it apart, put it back together again, and you would notice not a thing so long as the atoms were restored to their proper place. In fact, we could even use new atoms and you wouldn't care, since they are as interchangeable as Lego bricks.'
And lastly, Scotty, the question nobody's even started trying to answer:
Which of these two narratives is what really happens from your point of view?
I walk in to the office. I sit down in the chair. They put the helmet on my head. The scan is over in the time it takes me to blink. I get up and walk outside. A car screeches down the pavement and hits me. I fade away into nothingness.
I walk in to the office. I sit down in the chair. They put the helmet on my head. I blink. When I wake up, I am in a different room. "What happened?" I ask. "Did it work?" They tell me that it worked flawlessly, but that my other fork was killed shortly after the scan. "Shucks!" I say. "I waste all that money and one of my copies gets himself run over?"
It does sadden me that the same questions keep coming up, because it indicates that I'm phrasing the answers too densely for people to get across.
I'm going to point out at this junction that I both fully understand and fully agree with Battuta.
Since I get the feeling he must be feeling like he's trying to explain how a card trick works to a dog at this point.
Thank you, I appreciate it.
One more interesting thought experiment to ferret out the implicit dualism that is confusing people.
We all accept that we can be resuscitated after death so long as neural structures have not degenerated.
Imagine that you die and your brain rots into mush in a grave. However, someone applies an Anti-Entropic Field to your body, and you are regenerated back into perfect health.
Is this a new you, with the old you being dead? Or do you just feel as if you have been unconscious for some period of time?
If you answer the former, what is the latest point at which the Anti-Entropic Field can be applied to save 'the old you', as a resuscitation would?
Hopefully you'll see that no such firm mark can be drawn, and agree that even if the Anti-Entropic Field is used after you've been rotting for a hundred years, it is qualitatively no different from being resuscitated after an hour or after ten minutes, since in all cases you wake up with your brain more or less intact.
Now, ask yourself this: when I am reconstituted via Anti-Entropic Field, must the original matter in my body be used to remake me?